Abstract. In TPM 2.0, a single signature primitive is proposed to support various signature schemes including Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), U-Prove and Schnorr signature. This signature primitive is implemented by several APIs which can be utilized as a static DiffieHellman (SDH) oracle. In this paper, we measure the practical impact of the SDH oracle in TPM 2.0 and show the security strength of these signature schemes can be weakened by 13-bit. We propose a novel property of DAA called forward anonymity and show how to utilize these DAA-related APIs to break forward anonymity. Then we propose new APIs which not only remove the SDH oracle but also support the forward anonymity, thus significantly improve the security of DAA and the other signature schemes supported by TPM 2.0. We prove the security of our new APIs under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. We prove that the proposed DAA schemes satisfied the forward anonymity property using the new APIs under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our new APIs are almost as efficient as the original APIs in TPM 2.0 specification and can support LRSW-DAA and SDH-DAA together with U-Prove as the original APIs.
Introduction
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a special group signature scheme that enables remote authentication of a trusted platform which contains a valid TPM [1] while preserving the platform's privacy. Basically, DAA protocol allows a trusted platform called signer to sign arbitrary message and convince a verifier that the message is indeed signed by a valid TPM without leaking the signer's identity. A RSA-based DAA is proposed by Brickell et al. [2] . This RSA-based DAA is adopted by TCG and included in TPM 1.2 specification [3] . Since then several ECC-based DAA [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] are proposed to achieve better performance and shorter signature length. Some of them are now supported by the latest TPM 2.0 specification [1] . In TPM 2.0, a single TPM signature primitive [9] which can support various signature schemes including DAA and U-Prove is implemented by several DAA-related application programming interfaces (APIs).
An interesting feature of DAA is to provide differing degrees of privacy. While DAA signatures can be totally anonymous, a pseudonymous DAA signature can be linked to another signature by using a specific basename. A DAA signature
where G is a cylic group, k is the DAA secret key of the trusted platform and J = hash(basename) if basename =⊥. This ticket is used for linking and rogue tagging: given two signatures, if the two tickets in signatures are the same, then these two signatures are linked.
In some DAA schemes, including the scheme adopted by the TPM 1.2 specification, the TPM simply gets input J and output J k to the host, thus can be used as a static Diffie Hellman oracle which significantly reduces the security strength of DAA [10] . A security fix is proposed and is adopted by the TPM 2.0 specification [1] . Now in TPM 2.0 specification, TPM gets basename as input instead of J and calculates J = hash(basename) by itself. It is believed that there is no obvious way that TPM can be used as a static DH oracle even though the security proof of the DAA-related APIs in TPM 2.0 specification is still based on the static DH assumption [9] . Unfortunately, Tolga Acar et al. [11] show these DAA-related APIs can still be used as a static DH oracle. Moreover, we find the security proof [9] is not correct either, which is rather disturbing as DAA is one of the few complex cryptographic protocols deployed in real life. Hundreds of millions of computers have been equipped with TPM.
Another important feature of DAA is that the signer, i.e., the trusted platform, is split into two parts: the TPM part and the host part. The TPM is a low speed hardware chip with high security; the host normally is a X86-based PC equipped with powerful CPU but is easy to corrupt. While the security definitions of user-controlled traceability and non-frameability of DAA give the adversary the ability to compromise the host, all the previous definitions and analyses of anonymity of DAA [12, 13] consider a setting that the host and TPM are both honest. This is easy to understand, because if the host of a trusted platform is already corrupted when signing, it can easily reveal its identity together with the signature, so anonymity of the platform can not be preserved.
However, as host is easier to compromise than TPM, the host part of a trusted platform which is honest when signing can be controlled by the adversary later. The adversary can then utilize the APIs provided by the TPM to find out if a given signature was signed by this TPM previously, thus breaks the anonymity. For example, consider an adversary who has gathered DAA signatures sent to a service provider (this is quite reasonable as DAA signatures are not confidential, moreover the adversary can be a malicious service provider itself), by corrupting the host part of a specific user, he may be able to trace all the previous actions of this user, even if the DAA signatures produced by this user are totally anonymous.
Contribution
In this paper, we provide the following main contributions:
1. We measure the practical impact of the SDH oracle in TPM 2.0. We analyze the Barreto-Naehrig (BN) elliptic curves [14] defined in ISO/IEC 15946-5
